Peace, Or The Problem-Free Interval by Lohmann, Roger A.
Faculty Scholarship
10-1988
Peace, Or The Problem-Free Interval
Roger A. Lohmann
West Virginia University, roger.lohmann@mail.wvu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Counseling Commons, Nonprofit Administration and Management Commons, Other
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, and the Social Work Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Digital Commons Citation
Lohmann, Roger A., "Peace, Or The Problem-Free Interval" (1988). Faculty Scholarship. 873.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/faculty_publications/873
Peace, Or The Problem-Free Interval 
Inter-Program Evaluation and A General Outcome Measure 
 
Roger A. Lohmann, Ph.D. 
West Virginia University 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper argues for wider recognition of general program indicators as 
evaluative criteria and sets forth four general dimensions of outcome 
measures that might serve as comparative evaluative indicators for a wide 
range of programs and services. The argument for general program 
indicators of problem presence, frequency, duration and severity is grounded 
in general problem-solving theory and is part of an evaluative study of a 
mental health crisis unit. Peace, defined as a problem-free interval, is offered 
as an example of a general program outcome indicator.  
Most contemporary program evaluation involves endogenous comparison 
between the goals or purposes of a program and its accomplishments; 
between aspirations and results. Little attention has been devoted to the 
companion problem of exogenous evaluation: to the comparison (the 
valuation, if you will) of different goals or different accomplishments. While 
endogenous evaluation speaks to the issue of whether or not a particular 
intervention may be effective in some degree on its own terms, such 
evaluations typically cannot be used to compare different interventions. 
Although the discussion is carried forward here in the context of 
effectiveness, exactly the same comments about exogenous and endogenous 
evaluation apply to efficiency as an evaluative criterion. Exogenous 
evaluation is necessary in order to make such determinations. 
In pursuit of solutions to the problem of endogenous evaluation of social 
work practice, we have tended to ignore or downplay the problem of 
exogenous evaluation. As a result, we have led ourselves to believe, and 
sought to convince others, that the central problem of practice evaluation is 
the choice between effective and ineffective interventions. This is a 
fundamentally false conclusion and utterly misleading. It might be 
comforting to believe that all evaluations conform to the popular political 
rhetorical choices between “ineffective" and “effective” programs. To the 
extent that this is the case, strictly endogenous approaches to evaluation 
would be justified. However, in the real world of contemporary practice, that 
is seldom the case. 
The fact is that in the real worlds of practice and program planning, the 
more typical and momentous choice may be between two or more alternative 
interventions each of which is either arguably or demonstrably – on the basis 
of separate endogenous evaluations – effective (or, ineffective). Where the 
choice is clearly between a provably effective (or efficient) program and a 
demonstrably ineffective (or inefficient) one, preference is always for the 
former. But, in reality, such choices are few and far between.  
What about the more troubling (and much more common) cases where the 
choice is between two provably effective programs?  Or, the even more 
troubling cases of choice among marginally ineffective ones?   No matter how 
far we push back the horizons, at some point, the problem of exogenous 
evaluation will arise sooner or later:  Sometimes it is necessary to compare or 
evaluate different objects. In such cases, we must search out measures or 
criteria that are object-neutral; not predisposing us in favor of one choice or 
another. Thus, by various routes, we will inevitably arrive sooner or later at 
the problem of exogenous evaluations and general program indicators.  
General Program Indicators 
A general program indicator can be defined as a measure of program 
performance that can be applied to several different programs 
simultaneously. A program, in this case, is indicated by a distinct set of 
objectives. Thus, a general program indicator is one that can be used to 
compare different but programmatically related programs. Economists have 
been generally more interested than other social scientists in such 
comparisons. The general economic approach is to compare any two (or more) 
programs – no matter how different – using the common metric of money. 
Thus, measuring the increased earnings capacity of graduates of several 
different types of vocational and higher education programs is an example of 
such an indicator used widely in cost-benefit studies. The real question 
behind this investigation is whether it is possible to construct such general 
program indicators using a metric other than money. 
A general program indicator should serve several purposes:  First, it 
should enable comparisons between qualitatively different programs, 
including those with different goals, those operating in different 
communities, states or regions, and those serving different client groups. 
Second, a general program indicator should have both social and individual 
connotations, in order to allow considerations of the effects of both individual 
interventions and entire programs. Thirdly, in order to be genuinely useful, a 
general program should be comparative; to provide a common metric for 
assessing the amount and direction of change brought about by two distinct 
programs. Finally, a comparative indicator should allow us to deal both with 
questions of ends and purposes and with questions of means and resources. 
An indicator of this type consists of two components:  A concept with explicit 
substantive and theoretical implications and a measure with explicit 
operational implications. 
General program indicators of this type are noticeably absent in most 
areas of contemporary social work practice, and where they do exist, their 
programmatic significance is seldom clear. One such comparative indicator in 
widespread use (and already mentioned here) is simple monetary 
measurement:  We can, in most instances, note that program A expended 
$51,241 and program B expended $24,241. What exactly this tells us about 
the two programs (other than the fact that one spent more than twice as 
much as the other) is not clear. 
The focus of this paper is to outline the development of a set of indicators 
that may be useful for evaluation of a broad range of social welfare and 
related endeavors. The underlying concept involved is theoretically grounded 
in the pragmatic concept of problems and problem solving as a general model 
of social work intervention. As such, the proposed model also has 
implications for all of social work practice as well as large portions of 
planning and management and intervention in public health, community 
development and other fields. The model does not apply to activities that 
cannot be meaningfully described as problem-solving efforts.  
Background 
The emphasis on endogenous evaluation has produced a style of 
evaluation that might best be called methodological individualism. Such 
individualism has led in turn to a vast proliferation of special purpose 
evaluation measures. There are a number of debatable assumptions that 
form the basis for such an approach. For one thing, most social scientists who 
have worked on the development of program indicators have treated the 
issue of outcome assessment as methodological rather than theoretical (C.f., 
Caro, 1970; Rossi, Freeman and Wright, 1979). The basis for establishing the 
ends of programs and important questions such as who is qualified to 
determine such ends are treated as nonproblemmatic. Thus, the development 
of many evaluative indicators today employs the strategy of operational 
definition of variables derived on a largely ad hoc basis from preliminary 
analysis or study of the situation to be evaluated (Kidder and Judd, 1986; 
Rubin, 1983; Selltiz, 1959). 
This approach to program evaluation has been the dominant one for more 
than two decades. On the basis of this experience, it is possible to conclude 
that this "middle range" strategy (Merton, 1948) results in a threadbare 
methodological individualism in which there are strong incentives (including 
professional pride and career advancement opportunities) for each 
investigator to feel compelled to start anew in each evaluation with the 
definition of goals, measures and scales. When combined with widespread 
inattention to general theory, such methodological individualism literally 
begins nowhere and ends nowhere, but moves from here to there very 
precisely! Further, without general, comparative indicators of some type, the 
growing mountain of ad hoc   measures developed over the past two decades 
point only toward further methodological individualism and continuing 
proliferation of plausible suggested measures that generate grants, tenure 
and promotion for researchers, but raise only slight interest among 
practitioners, decision makers and policy makers. Whatever other 
advantages they may have, proposals for standardized packages of such 
individualistic measures, like Hudson’s clinical measurement package, do not 
really address large parts of the issue of exogenous evaluation, since by 
definition they preclude comparisons of or with nonclinical alternatives.  
General Models  
What is needed are general models linking operations to outcomes in 
more general ways and enabling comparisons of different outcomes across 
programs. This was part of the original program of English utilitarianism, 
and one of the reasons for its enduring attraction for decision-makers:  
whether labeled "happiness", "utility", "welfare," "subjective utility", "the 
pleasure/pain calculus" or by some other name, there is little doubt that 
utilitarianism aims for such a universal measure. Likewise, there is little 
doubt that this measure, by whatever name, has held little intrinsic interest 
in social work practice except for administrative/financial decisions. 
If, initially, it should prove impossible to create a model of sufficient 
generality to encompass all possible evaluations, we might still be guided by 
a general rule of thumb for generality that any model that applies to more 
situations is preferable to one that applies to fewer, all other things being 
equal. In the following pages we shall be concerned with such a model in the 
context of problem-solving:  No claims are made for its universal generality to 
all human “problems”. Yet, it is claimed that it can be applied to a broad (if 
unspecified) class of problems that includes, but is not necessarily limited to 
problems of poverty, mental illness, illness and diseases or all sorts, abuse, 
neglect and domestic violence, alcohol and substance abuse and disabilities. 
For reasons that will become clear, this class of problems shall be referred to 
in general as problems of “social dependency”.  
A Problem-Solving Model  
The very first step in identification of a general indicator of successful 
intervention involves identifying the "something" in common that all 
interventions in a general class possess. A number of possibilities arise:  The 
utilitarian/economic tradition would argue for “utility”, “happiness” or 
“welfare” as such a measure. In general, utility models may be useful for 
endogenous comparisons but are seldom useful for exogenous comparative 
purposes, because they fail to overcome the problems of interpersonal 
comparison (Sen, 1982). Others might suggest some variation of "need" or “need 
reduction” as common dimensions. However, need also appears to suffer from 
problems of psychological reduction, as well as measurement problems (there 
being no widely recognized general measures of need, despite the widespread 
rhetorical uses of this concept.) 
Problem-solving is the most widely accepted model of contemporary social 
work practice, incorporated into official definitions of the field, and 
encompassing all known and generally accepted modes of practice from therapy 
to community planning. As such, the problem-solving model offers an 
apparently broad range of possibilities for a set of general program indicators. In 
fact, it appears to be the case that all problems of social work intervention can be 
stated in terms of problem-solving models. The general view that one solves 
problems by defining them, identifying alternatives, assessing alternative 
intervention strategies, and choosing among them is, in fact,  so universal in 
social work practice, that to many it is considered virtually the natural attitude. 
Thus, constructing a general program indicator within the logic of the problem-
solving model has strong intuitive appeal. 
Problems and Problem-Solving 
Before we can begin to construct such a problem-solving indicator, however, 
we need to look more closely at problem-solving theory. To Dewey and the 
other pragmatists, the experience of a problem is a universal one for individuals 
and groups. Recognizable problems erupt into the flow of "normal" (that is, non-
problematic) personal or group experience and divert attention away from other 
things. In experiencing problems, we redirect our attention, temporarily or 
permanently, from other concerns and focus on the problem -- on "what's 
wrong". When the problem is resolved, we then direct our attention back to 
other concerns. Thus, an important (and measurable) aspect of the meaning of 
"solving" a problem is the redirection of attention away from the problem that 
signals or indicates a "solution". 
Walter Hudson once suggested that any client problem can be measured in 
terms of its: 1)  Binary status  (presence or absence); 2)  Frequency; 3)  Duration;  
or 4)  Magnitude (intensity)  (Hudson, 1982)  Presence/absence could be treated 
as a precondition rather than a characteristic of problems, since it is impossible 
to determine the other characteristics of problems that are absent. Thus, we are 
left with three primary dimensions around which it may be possible to organize 
the comparison of different client problems. If these same characteristics can also 
be applied generally to problems experienced by people before they become 
clients and after they cease to be clients these same criteria might also be 
extended to the comparison of clinical and non-clinical interventions. Thus, 
comparison of the frequency, duration and intensity of problems could yield a 
high-powered model of exogenous evaluation. 
Binary Status  
The diagnostic or definitional problem of whether or not a problem is or is 
not present, as every practitioner knows, is not a straightforward, simple one. 
There is, for example, the issue of dormancy as in cancer and other chronic 
diseases. The problem may be there, but not demonstrating any evident 
symptoms or characteristics at the moment. In the same vein, the symptoms or 
characteristics may be below the threshold of observation. In the case of many 
social problems, such as poverty or deviant behavior, there is also the voting 
problem:  If there are differences of opinion about whether the problem is 
present, who is qualified or recognized to make the final determination of 
whether or not a problem exists?  The client?  The practitioner?  A panel of 
neutral authorities?  The community? And what is to be done if there are 
differences of opinion? 
As noted above, the status of a problem might be handled as a precondition 
of problem measurement. However, there is at least heuristic value in following 
Hudson’s binary logic as we shall see. Thus, one can stipulate that any actor 
(person, group, organization, community, etc.) can at any particular moment be 
in any of four states with respect to a particular problem: 
At any given point with respect to a particular definable problem, one either 
has the problem (to any extent) or not. Likewise, one may or may not be aware 
of having any particular problem. Thus, one may have a problem and be aware 
of it; have a problem and be unaware of it; perceive a problem one does not, in 
fact, have; or knowingly have no (particular) problem. 
In the latter instance, we may say unambiguously that one is “problem-free”. 
Being problem-free would appear to be a more encompassing notion than 
contrasting “problem” with “solution” since the former allows comparison not 
only between those who have a problem and those who don’t; it also links those 
who formerly had a problem with those who never did. As should be evident, 
problem-status measures are, by their nature cross-sectional point-in-time 
measures that in a dynamic world are constantly in need of update. To the extent 
that the argument of this paper is successful, for example, those who have 
completed this section will, it is hoped, be experiencing at least the vague, 
inchoate sensations of an emerging intellectual problem. As such, they are 
crossing the status boundary referred to above. 
One of the foremost reasons for the kinds of professional assessment 
activities in social work is to provide for authoritative resolution of binary status 
issues. One of the roles of professional social work assessments is to certify that 
problems do (or do not) exist, and to label and classify them as to type and kind. 
Frequency 
Frequency is a measure of how often a phenomenon recurs. The 
measurement of frequency ordinarily involves counting or estimating 
incidence, or the number of occurrences, in a given time period. In the 
context of problem solving, frequency is thus a measure of how frequently the 
problem in question recurs in a given time-period. As the Hudson model 
noted above suggests, frequency is one of the fundamental measures of client 
problems. 
Contemporary social problem theory is often remarkable indifferent to 
both frequency and duration. The usual approach is that either a problem is 
eliminated completely and permanently, or else we conclude the program has 
failed to achieve its objectives. This was the approach of Girls at Vocational 
High, one of the early evaluative studies, where the issue was the eradication 
of delinquency through casework intervention (Meyer, Borgotta & Jones, 
1965). This was also the approach of the original Head Start evaluations, 
where the finding that the effects of Head Start were only discernable for 4-5 
years was widely considered evidence of the program's ineffectiveness 
(Cicarelli, 1971; Evans, 1971). This was also the approach of Fischer's 
negative assessment of the effectiveness of casework.(Fischer, 1970)  Indeed, 
this has been the approach of much social program evaluation. 
The proliferation of endogenous evaluation in the public policy arena has 
probably exacerbated this kind of ideal suggesting that client problems that 
are effectively dealt with will occur only once. They will be diagnosed, 
effectively and efficiently treated and never again reappear. Thus, recurrent 
problems of a similar type can be interpreted in themselves as evidence of 
ineffective problem-solving. In the real worlds of clients, problems do recur 
and the frequency with which they recur seems to be far less a matter of the 
effectiveness of prior interventions than it is of the existential conditions of 
clients' lives. Persistently and chronically mentally ill and substance-abusing 
persons (to take two of the hardest cases) may be effectively "cured" time and 
time again only to have their problems recur at some later date. 
With all types of grave or serious problems, there is an absolute frequency 
threshold:  For murder, rape and child abuse, for example, a single 
occurrence is too many. When such problems do recur, absolute cessation of 
any additional occurrences is always the only morally acceptable standard. 
However, it is a sad fact that such repeated occurrences do happen, despite 
the best of intentions all around. In such cases, (often referred to as 
"revolving door" episodes or problems) reducing the frequency of occurrence 
may be of equal or greater importance as an objective to complete elimination 
of the problem. We will return to this point below. 
Duration 
Duration is a measure of how long a problem lasts when it occurs. 
Measurement of problem duration requires two time estimates: a 
determination of time-of-onset and a determination of time-of-cure 
(elimination or departure of the problem, or return to problem-free status). 
Duration, then, is the elapsed time determined by subtracting onset from 
cure. In theory, all problems and conditions are measurable by their 
duration, as Hudson suggests. In reality, this is not always the case. By 
definition, chronic diseases and conditions are those that last permanently, 
or sufficiently long that measuring their duration is not practical or feasible. 
In such cases, measurement of their duration may be impossible, counter-
intuitive or just plain pointless. 
Another aspect of chronic conditions that confounds measurement of 
duration is the problem of "invidious (or unknown point of) onset". It is quite 
literally impossible in the cases of certain diseases like cancers, and social 
problems like family violence, alcoholism, poverty, or stress to state exactly 
when the problem began. One cannot determine with precision in many cases 
even when awareness of the problem occurred. Indeed, the invidious 
character of some types of problems points not to the point of origin of the 
problem but only toward the existence of what might be termed the 
"threshold of indifference.”  The limits of the experience of these types of 
problems are not onset to extinction, but rather the interval between an 
initial "horizon of indifference" when the problem enters conscious experience 
and a later "horizon of indifference" after which the problem is experienced 
only as a memory. In the initial indifferent state, there would be no sense of 
a problem (whether or not its presence might have been detected by a neutral 
observer equipped with hindsight). And after the later threshold is passed, 
the active experience of the problematic is past, regardless of whether or not 
the problem is gone. Together, these two thresholds of indifference appear to 
sufficient for defining the duration of a problem, as noted above. This may 
even be the case, albeit in modified form, for problems involving unconscious 
processes. Duration, in this sense, corresponds in many respects with the 
epidemiological measurement of the prevalence of chronic diseases. Such 
inter-threshold estimates of problem-duration may be useful in comparisons 
determining program effectiveness across populations. In this, they might 
function much like infant mortality statistics, for example, or cancer-
prevalence rates.  
Psychosocial problems characterized by chronicity are also often 
punctuated by various types of periodic crises and acute episodes whose onset 
and departure can be measured more precisely and whose duration appears 
to be programmatically meaningful:  e.g., an alcoholic binge lasting five days 
is ordinarily judged to be objectively more serious and damaging than one 
lasting overnight, quite independent of any other information about the 
person involved. As several decades of experience with crisis intervention 
have made clear, a surprising number of social and psychological problems 
share with many chronic diseases this quality of being punctuated by crises 
of measurable duration, even if the duration of the underlying chronic 
problem cannot be accurately estimated in non-trivial ways. 
As with the discussion of relative frequency above, it is the case also that 
in the absence of complete problem-elimination or cessation, reducing the 
interval of problem-duration can be a general objective for many types of 
intervention efforts. Moreover, with the aid of a seemingly straight forward 
assumption, duration can be transformed into a genuinely comparative 
measure. 
It is certainly the case that, all other things (in particular, the status of 
the client at discharge) being equal, reducing the duration of a problem can 
be a significantly desirable program objective in many cases. Thus, ability to 
reduce a transient psychotic episode (e.g., hallucinations) from a matter of 
days to a matter of hours is a significant and nontrivial accomplishment, 
independent of the complete prevention of all future psychotic episodes. 
One of the reasons that this is so is closely related to what economists call 
"the opportunity cost" of such an episode. A crisis episode of any sort is not 
ordinarily judged as time well spent. (If you doubt this, just recall any 
episode of personal vomiting or diarrhea.) Most people (including most 
persistently and chronically mentally ill people) could, as a result, readily 
identify the opportunity cost of such an episode in terms of things they would 
rather have been doing during the time of a crisis. Thus, for example, the 
opportunity cost of a crisis brought on by anxiety over a friend's wedding may 
well be missing the wedding. Opportunity cost in this sense may offer a 
number of clues to the general significance of duration in comparative 
program evaluation (as well as severity, as we shall see below.) 
In the immediate context, however,  we are most concerned with an 
assumption underlying this approach:  For such an opportunity cost 
comparison to be tenable requires, among others, an assumption of time 
equivalence implicit in the very idea of duration. Roughly speaking, any 
interval of time in a client or crisis-victim's life is roughly equal to the same 
interval at another point in that life. A two-day binge in October is 
equivalent to a two-day binge in December. 
From this, it is but a small step to an assumption of truly comparative 
character for duration:  An interval of time in the life of any person is 
roughly equivalent to the same interval of time in the life of another person. 
Thus, twenty-seven crisis episodes in a year for Client A is more than 15 
episodes in a year for Client B, even if Client A is an alcoholic and Client B is 
persistently and chronically mentally ill. On the basis of the above 
assumption, it is also the case that 31 days of outpatient treatment in a year 
for Client B is a longer problem-duration than 15 days of psychiatric 
hospitalization for Client C. To the extent that this is the case, duration, like 
frequency offers a genuinely comparative indicator suitable for use as a 
general program indicator. 
Severity 
It remains now to examine what Hudson calls problem magnitude (and 
what will be termed severity here). By whatever name, comparative 
measurement of the relative seriousness of different problems is certainly the 
most challenging of all problem-dimensions from the standpoint of exogenous 
evaluation. It is certainly the case that some problems (e.g., a broken finger 
nail) may be less serious than others (e.g., a suicide attempt). Within the 
pragmatic tradition of problem solving, such magnitude or seriousness or 
intensity is ordinarily determined by the consequences of the problem. Thus 
a broken fingernail is ordinarily judged a trivial problem precisely to the 
degree that it is seldom painful, results in little or no functional impairment, 
does not interfere with cognition or other psychological processes, does not 
produce economic dislocation, social stigma or political disenfranchisement, 
and is entirely reversible. By contrast, a suicide attempt is ordinarily judged 
a more serious problem precisely because it may be extremely painful, 
produce blindness, disability or other functional impairments, disrupt 
psychological functioning in various ways, result in lost employment, social 
stigma and at least temporary loss of civil rights, and may result in death. 
Within the definition of problem offered by the pragmatic problem-solving 
perspective, the number of problems faced by the ordinary person in a life-
time is enormous. And they range in seriousness from the problems of 
choosing a career, a partner in life, or whether to die by jumping off a 
building, to the problem of deciding which pair of shoes to wear or whether to 
have dessert for lunch.  
The concept of problem-severity in one sense implies being able to place 
all problems on a ratio scale with a fixed zero point at which problem-
intensity is absolute zero (there is no problem) and an upper limit at which 
intensity reaches some point of theoretical saturation (the problem boiling 
point, as it were). This would be the analog of a social problem thermometer 
that would enable the equivalent of "taking the client's temperature" to 
determine the seriousness of each problem experienced. Unfortunately, there 
is no discernable underlying analog to the core body temperature to make 
such a measurement practically possible or theoretically meaningful, even if 
such a scale were to be devisable. 
One alternative approach to social work problem solving might be to 
proceed to establish short, partial rank orderings of the intensity of selected 
problems in comparison to designated other problems. It should be 
theoretically possible to establish a complete rank ordering of the seriousness 
of our problems, using a device like pair-wise matching. This, in fact, 
corresponds to the modern approach to measurement of subjective utility in 
economics and utilitarianism. Ordinal pairings of the intensity of problems 
should allow us to determine which in any given pair of problems is “more” 
and which is “less” serious, and eventually to establish complete rank 
ordered series of problem seriousness. Although theoretically possible, this 
problem of establishing such a complete rank ordering of all our problems is, 
for most of us, sharply bounded by indifference. As a practical matter, I 
simply do not care, in most instances, whether the selection of loaves of bread 
in the supermarket is a greater or lesser problem for me than whether to 
watch the television weather. The sequential flow of events in my life tends 
to limit and constrain many such choices, rendering them irrelevant long 
before I might complete the necessary rankings and this proves on the whole 
to be a workable way to get through my day. However, at any given time and 
place, certain choices will nonetheless present themselves. The first 
assumption of any measurement of problem seriousness, therefore, is that it 
will be an incomplete ranking of only selected problems. Thus, the issue of 
criteria for selection of problems is, itself, an issue. 
DSM-III, Axis IV 
Assume, further, that the problems that most intrigue social workers can 
be divided, very broadly, into at least four possible categories:  organic 
problems, involving the body or one or more of the major organ systems; 
psychological problems, involving various cognitive and affective states; 
economic/resource problems, involving broadly problems of survival and 
social reproduction; and social/interactional problems, involving dealings 
with others.  
Then assume that the intensity of problems in each of these areas can be 
plotted on a Likert-type scale from less severe to more severe. This would 
yield four Likert scale items as follows (with unsubstantiated estimates of 
where intervals between steps may occur w/o attempting to measure the 
intervals): 
 
Figure 1 
Four Dimensions of a Problem 
DSM-III,Axis IV Organic  Psychological Resources  Interactional 
None Health  Opulence  
Mild Nuisance Bliss Wealth Transcendence 
Moderate Threat Happiness Affluence Autonomy 
Severe Disability Contentment Poverty Unrec. Need 
Extreme Pain Tension Destitution Impairment 
Catastrophic Death Stress Survival Dependency 
 
 
Peace: The Problem-Free Interval 
Any one of these dimensions (organic, psychological, economic/resources 
or interactional can also be characterized at any given point in time in terms 
of its problem (or problem-free) interval, as shown in Figure 2 below. The 
combined effect of these four dimensions can also be mapped as a Problem 
Space (see Figure 3 below).  
In such cases, it is fair to say that, within limits, problems delayed are 
problems prevented. Thus, the timing of the onset and the duration of the 
solution (its "problem-free interval") are important indicators of the success 
of problem-solving efforts involving either prevention and intervention. (See 
Appendix 1 below.) 
 
Figure 2 
 
For example, virtually all parents feel a sense of relief when their 
children are no longer juveniles, for they know that whatever problems arose 
in their children's teenage years, for most it probably could have been worse. 
How often does one hear relatives, friends or neighbors concerned over a 
particular juvenile warn "It's only a matter of time" before the kid gets into 
trouble?   But, in such developmental cases, trouble delayed sufficiently long 
may mean trouble prevented. Eventually, maturity, and a new and different 
range of issues and problems will probably replace those of adolescence. 
There is, of course, another class of developmental problems where delay 
merely aggravates the eventual problem-onset that can easily be fitted into 
this same model. 
Or, consider the question of prevention of skin cancer. The issue is not 
really whether or not a very large share of us sitting in this room will get 
some form of skin cancer. That is a foregone conclusion; virtually a by-
product of our genetic makeup, location on the planet and lifestyles. The real 
issue is how long we can delay the onset and retard the progression of the 
disease (with shade, sunscreens, etc.). That is, what our remaining problem-
free interval will be. In skin cancer and many types of cancer treatment, 
 Figure 3 
  The Intensity of Problems  
 
 
"remission" or slowing the development of the disease (or extending the 
problem-free interval) is the treatment objective, and remission of sufficiently 
long duration (for example, past the point of death from other causes) is 
tantamount to cure. Consider also the problems of alcoholism, other forms of 
substance abuse, and mental illness. In all of these cases, the "revolving 
door" syndrome of repeated problem episodes followed by temporary cures 
followed by repetition of the entire cycle ad infinitum is commonplace. In 
such cases, it seems totally unrealistic to suggest that the only adequate 
criterion for the effectiveness of alcohol treatment programs is some type of 
"magic bullet" that will immediately and permanently reverse this cycle and 
do so in the least costly manner possible. Likewise, is it really the case that 
community treatment of the mentally ill is a failure when the chronic 
mentally ill experience periodic psychotic episodes on the outside? 
Or, consider problems like unemployment and homelessness where time 
is also a factor of great importance and generally recognized as such by those 
experiencing the problem. In both cases, sufferers typically express the 
seriousness of their problem in terms of it duration:  "I've been unemployed 
for two years, now."  "We've been looking for an apartment we could afford 
for six months."  Yet most measurements of these problems, whether of need 
or the effectiveness of interventions deal only with static, cross-sectional 
measures. We hear estimates of the number of homeless this year, without 
indication of whether they were homeless for a night or a lifetime. Incumbent 
administrations in Washington routinely claim they have achieved the lowest 
unemployment rate in years whenever they can, with no consideration 
whatsoever for how long the currently unemployed may have been that way. 
This latter question, it should be noted also, is an issue of major importance 
in the suspected emergence of a permanently unemployed underclass, and in 
the related issue of structural unemployment.  
Temporal perspective is also common applied to personal descriptions of 
other major life crises and losses:  Grieving widows common report "I lost my 
husband 7 years ago this month."  In the farm belt today, one hears often 
"We lost our farm last January". In such cases, it is quite likely that there is 
a correlation between the active experience of the problem and its experience 
as time-related. The widow who is no longer actively grieving is more likely 
to say "My husband is dead", and the ex-farmer who has made a satisfactory 
life transition is likely to report that he used to be a farmer. 
In sum, the failure to take the duration of social problems into account as 
part of an interrelated set of evaluative measures ignores important 
universal features of the problem experience and inhibits our ability to 
compare problems. For activities that can be characterized as problem-
solving, both the duration of the problem and the duration of the solution 
appear to be potentially interesting and useful measures. 
Conclusion 
Problem-solving is one of the most common models of intervention. We 
can measure critical dimensions of the comparative successes and failures of 
problem-solving activities by comparing the peace that they bring--that is, 
the duration of their respective problem free intervals. It is this period of 
problem-freedom, and not the duration of problems, that offers the basis for 
genuine comparative measurement of the effectiveness of problem-solving 
efforts.  
Peace, in the sense of a problem-free interval, can be employed as a purely 
formal comparative measure of the elapsed time between resolution of a 
problem episode and the onset of a new problem episode of the same type. 
(See Appendix A below for assorted definitions of the term peace, which 
accord with this labeling.) In the absence of overriding moral constraints that 
render anything short of complete, life-time resolution of a problem 
unacceptable, peace offers an important comparison of qualitatively different 
types of problem-solving activity. 
 
APPENDIX  A 
Peace Defined 
 
The Random House Dictionary of the English 
Language (New York. 1967) defines peace as: 
"1. the normal, non-warring condition of a nation, 
group of nations or the world. 2. an agreement or 
treaty between warring or antagonistic nations, 
groups, etc., to end hostilities and abstain from 
further fighting or antagonism; the Peace of 
Ryswick. 3. a state of mutual harmony between 
people or groups, esp. in personal relations: Try to 
live in peace with your neighbors. 4. the normal 
freedom from civil commotion and violence of a 
community; public order and security: He was 
arrested for being drunk and breaking the peace. 5. 
cessation of or freedom from strife or dissension. 6. 
freedom of the mind from annoyance, distraction, 
anxiety, an obsession, etc; tranquility, serenity. 7. a 
state of tranquility or serenity: May he rest in 
peace. 8. a state or condition conducive to, 
proceeding from, or characterized by tranquility: 
the peace of a mountain resort. 9. silence, stillness:  
the cawing of a crow broke the afternoon's peace. 
10. a comedy by Aristophenes (421 B.C.). 11. 
holding one's peace. to refrain from or cease 
speaking; keep silent:  He told her to hold her 
peace until he had finished. 12. keep the peace, to 
maintain order; cause to refrain from creating a 
disturbance: Several officers of the law were on 
hand to keep the peace. 13. make one's peace, to 
become reconciled; acquiesce: He repaired the fence 
he had broken and made his peace with the 
neighbor on whose property it stood. 14. make 
peace, to ask for or arrange a cessation of hostilities 
or antagonism. --v.i. 15. Obs. to be or become silent. 
--interj. 16. keep still!  silence!. . . . " 
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